Regional Benches of the Supreme Court of India: The Need of the Hour

I. The Centralisation Conundrum and Its Historical Roots

The Supreme Court of India, since its inauguration on 28 January 1950, has functioned as a singular, unitary institution located in New Delhi. Article 130 of the Constitution states: "The Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place or places, as the Chief Justice of India may, with the approval of the President, from time to time, appoint." Despite the enabling phrase "other place or places," the apex court has never established a permanent bench outside the capital. In 2026, with a staggering pendency of over 83,000 cases, rising costs of litigation, and a growing sense of alienation among litigants from southern, eastern, and northeastern states, the demand for Regional Benches has intensified. This article argues that establishing four Regional Benches in Chennai, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Bengaluru or Hyderabad is no longer a matter of choice but a constitutional imperative rooted in the preamble's promise of justice: social, economic, and political.

The debate is as old as the Republic itself. In the Constituent Assembly, Shri K. Santhanam and others raised concerns about the central location being inaccessible to millions. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while defending the Delhi location, acknowledged that the provision was flexible enough to allow benches elsewhere. In the 1980s, the Tenth Law Commission Report (1984) recommended setting up Constitution Benches in Delhi and Circuit Benches elsewhere. The 121st Report on the Supreme Court (1988) reiterated the need. More recently, in 2024, a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Law and Justice unanimously recommended that the government explore an amendment to Article 130 to mandate regional sittings. Yet, resistance from a section of the Delhi-based Bar, apprehensions about fragmentation of the judiciary, and logistical concerns have stymied progress. This article dismantles these objections through a granular analysis of the constitutional text, comparative federal models, statistical data on case origins, and the transformative potential of technology. It proposes a hybrid model: a strong Supreme Court in Delhi for constitutional adjudication and regional benches for appellate work, ensuring both uniformity and accessibility.

The phrase "need of the hour" is not rhetorical. In 2025-26, the Supreme Court disposed of 51,000 cases but received 58,000 new filings a net increase. The average lifespan of a civil appeal is now 7-10 years. The cost of litigating from a distance is conservatively estimated at 5-7 lakhs for a party from Chennai, and 8-10 lakhs for a party from the Northeast. This is not merely an inconvenience; it is a denial of equal access to justice, violating the spirit of Article 14 and 39A. Regional benches would decentralise justice, reduce pendency, and restore faith in the judiciary as a truly national institution.

II. The Constitutional Architecture: Article 130 and the Framers' Intent (Expanded)

Article 130 is permissive, not mandatory. Its phrasing, "shall sit in Delhi or such other place or places", clearly contemplates the possibility of multiple seats. The Constituent Assembly debates of 1948 reveal that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while introducing the draft article, did not rule out benches elsewhere. The original intention was to have the seat at Delhi, but with flexibility. Some members, like Mr. Mohamed Ismail Sahib, argued for a roving court or benches in different regions to make justice accessible to all. Dr. Ambedkar responded that the provision gave enough power to the Chief Justice to appoint other places. Therefore, the framers planted the seed for regional benches; it is for the present generation to water it. The provision was designed to adapt to the needs of a vast and diverse nation. Over 75 years later, the need has crystallised.

Legal scholars have also pointed to the parallel of the Federal Court of India, which sat at Delhi but also held circuit sittings at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay in the 1940s. The practice was discontinued after Independence, but the precedent exists. The Government of India Act, 1935, under which the Federal Court functioned, also allowed for flexibility. Thus, history and text align in favour of regional benches.

III. The Access Deficit: Distance, Cost, and Exclusion A Data-Driven Analysis

For a litigant from Kanyakumari or the Northeast, reaching Delhi entails a journey of thousands of kilometres, prohibitive airfare, and the cost of staying in an expensive city. A study by the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy (2025) estimated that the average cost for a litigant from Chennai to pursue an appeal in the Supreme Court including travel, accommodation, local conveyance, and higher fees of Delhi counsel is approximately 5-7 lakhs, excluding court fees and potential loss of wages. This effectively closes the doors of the apex court to all but the wealthy, or those backed by well-funded corporations. The promise of equal justice under Article 14 is compromised when geography determines access. Moreover, the concentration of senior advocates in Delhi creates a monopoly, further inflating costs. Regional benches would allow litigants to be represented by counsel of their region, familiar with the socio-legal context, at a fraction of the cost.

A 2024 survey by the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association revealed that 67% of litigants from the southern states said they would be more likely to pursue appeals if a bench existed in their zone. The "access deficit" also affects the quality of arguments: local nuances of language, custom, and land laws are often lost in translation when argued before a Delhi-centric bench. Regional benches would bring the court closer to the people, not merely geographically but culturally.

Statistical Snapshot: Pendency and Regional Origins

As of March 2026, out of 83,472 pending cases, approximately 40% originate from states beyond the northern region (Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, UP). The five southern states (TN, Karnataka, Kerala, AP, Telangana) account for 22% of pending matters. The eastern and northeastern states contribute another 15%. If these cases could be heard in regional centres, the burden on the Delhi establishment would reduce significantly, leading to faster disposal. Moreover, the Supreme Court's own data shows that the average time from filing to listing for an SLP from the southern region is 14 months, compared to 9 months for matters from Delhi-NCR, due to administrative convenience.

The cost factor is not just about money; it includes time away from work, disruption of family life, and the psychological barrier of approaching a distant institution. For marginalised communities, this is often insurmountable. The Constitution (Article 39A) mandates equal justice and free legal aid. Regional benches would be the single most effective measure to realise this directive principle.

IV. The Pendency Crisis and the Case for Specialisation (Expanded with Workload Analysis)

The Supreme Court currently has a sanctioned strength of 34 judges. Despite the introduction of e-filing and hybrid hearings post-2020, the disposal rate has not kept pace with the filing rate. The court hears an average of 50-60 matters per bench per day, a staggering workload that leaves little time for deep deliberation on complex constitutional questions. Regional benches would allow for the bifurcation of work: constitution benches (comprising 5, 7, or more judges) sitting in Delhi to decide significant questions of law and public importance, while division benches in regions hear routine appeals, special leave petitions (SLPs) arising from the respective High Courts, and matters involving local laws. This would also enable specialisation for instance, a bench in Mumbai could develop expertise in maritime, corporate, and tax law, while a bench in Chennai could focus on maritime, water disputes, and southern zamindari matters.

The average number of working days for the Supreme Court is about 190 days a year. In each of those days, a judge may read 200-300 pages of case files. This is unsustainable. Regional benches would distribute the workload and allow judges to focus on cases from a particular region, reducing the time needed to understand local laws and customs. Furthermore, regional benches could adopt cause lists tailored to regional holidays and conditions, improving efficiency.

In Australia, the High Court sits in various state capitals, though its principal seat is Canberra. This practice acknowledges the vast distances and the need for accessibility. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada occasionally sits outside Ottawa, particularly for cases with significant regional impact. India, with its even greater diversity, should follow suit.

V. Federalism and the Symbolism of a Dispersed Court

India is a federal union. The location of the final court in one city sends a centralising message. Federalism thrives when institutions are representative and geographically diffused. The United Kingdom, traditionally centralised, now permits the UK Supreme Court to sit in Edinburgh and Belfast for devolution matters. Australia's High Court sits in Canberra, but also regularly in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane. Canada's Supreme Court sits in Ottawa, but its judges come from all regions. India's unitary apex court location creates a perceptual gulf between the court and the masses. A bench in Chennai, for example, would inspire confidence among southern litigants that their regional legal culture and arguments are better understood. It would also ease the burden on High Courts, which often feel that their judgments are mechanically overturned without full appreciation of local context.

The federal principle under Article 1 of the Constitution describes India as a "Union of States." The judiciary is the arbiter of federal disputes. If the court is seen as too Delhi-centric, states may feel that their interests are not adequately represented. Regional benches would address this perception, reinforcing the federal character of the Indian polity.

VI. Counter-Arguments and Detailed Rebuttals

A. Threat to Uniformity and Stare Decisis

The strongest objection is that multiple benches could lead to conflicting precedents, undermining the uniformity of law. This is a genuine concern but not insurmountable. First, the principle of stare decisis would apply: all benches are bound by Supreme Court judgments. Any conflict could be resolved by a larger bench in Delhi. Second, technology enables instant access to all judgments. A robust reporting system and a unified digital database (already in place via the Supreme Court's website and SCC Online) ensure that judges are aware of all precedents. Third, the Constitution Bench in Delhi could retain exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional references, federal disputes, and cases where there is an intra-circuit conflict. The US federal circuit model demonstrates that a decentralised appellate system can coexist with legal uniformity. Moreover, conflicting interpretations among High Courts already exist, and the Supreme Court resolves them. Regional benches would not create a new problem; they would merely shift some of that conflict-resolution to a structured process.

B. Infrastructure and Cost A Realistic Assessment

Establishing four new benches would require significant investment: courtrooms, judges' chambers, libraries, staff quarters, and security. The initial outlay is estimated at 2,000-3,000 crores. However, this is a fraction of the economic cost of delayed justice and lost productivity. Moreover, the government's current budget for the judiciary (approx. 15,000 crore in 2025-26) can be augmented with a specific allocation. The long-term benefit in terms of enhanced access, reduced travel subsidies, and economic multiplier effects in those cities would outweigh the costs. Additionally, existing infrastructure in the form of High Court buildings can be temporarily shared, and new complexes can be built over a 5-year period. The Chief Justice of India, in consultation with the government, can phase the rollout, starting with one bench in Chennai or Mumbai as a pilot project.

C. Resistance from the Delhi Bar Addressing Parochial Concerns

The Supreme Court Bar Association has historically resisted regional benches, fearing loss of work and influence. However, this is a parochial concern that cannot trump the constitutional rights of millions. A transition period could ensure that existing vested interests are accommodated senior advocates may appear in regional benches via video-conferencing, and the Delhi Bar will still have primacy in constitution bench matters. The overall volume of litigation would increase with access, potentially creating more work for the legal profession nationally. In fact, regional benches would generate new opportunities for lawyers in those cities, democratising the profession. The Delhi Bar would still handle the most important constitutional cases, and its expertise would be in demand across the country.

D. Dilution of the Supreme Court's Prestige

Some argue that having multiple seats would dilute the prestige and authority of the Supreme Court. This is a specious argument. The Supreme Court of the United States sits in one building, but its authority is undiminished. The prestige of a court derives from the quality of its judgments, not the number of buildings it occupies. Regional benches would be part of the same institution, with the same seal, the same registry, and the same binding authority. The Chief Justice would remain the head of all benches. Prestige would only increase as the court becomes more accessible and relevant to ordinary citizens.

VII. The 2026 Debate: Reports, Recommendations and Political Will

In January 2026, the Chief Justice of India, in his address at the National Judicial Academy, hinted that "the time is ripe to consider alternative seats" for the Supreme Court. A private member's bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha in February 2026 seeking to amend Article 130 to mandate at least four regional benches. The Law Commission of India is currently examining the feasibility. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court itself has started experimenting with hybrid benches: some judges hear matters from their locations, but the formal seat remains Delhi. The next step is to issue a notification under Article 130(1) appointing Chennai, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Bengaluru as additional seats. This could be done without amendment, but to avoid legal challenges, a constitutional amendment may be desirable to provide a clear framework.

The political climate in 2026 is more favourable than ever. Regional parties from the south and east have made this a key demand. The central government has indicated its willingness to consider the proposal, provided the judiciary takes the lead. A consensus is emerging that access to justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of tradition. The 2026 Monsoon Session of Parliament may see the introduction of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill to insert a new article or modify Article 130 to provide for at least three regional benches.

VIII. Comparative Constitutional Models: Lessons from Abroad (In-depth)

United States

The US federal judiciary comprises 94 district courts, 13 circuit courts of appeals, and one Supreme Court. The circuit courts are regional (e.g., 9th Circuit covers western states). They hear appeals from district courts, and the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only about 1% of cases. This system balances regional access with national uniformity. India could adopt a similar tier: the Supreme Court (Delhi) as the apex, and Regional Supreme Court Benches functioning like circuit courts. This would require a statutory change, but it is a proven model.

United Kingdom

The UK Supreme Court (established 2009) sits primarily in London but has sat in Edinburgh for Scottish devolution cases and in Belfast for Northern Irish cases. The Justices also sit on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which hears appeals from Commonwealth nations. The UK experience shows that occasional sittings outside the capital are feasible and symbolically important.

Australia

The High Court of Australia is constitutionally required to sit in Canberra (the capital) but also sits in other state capitals for convenience. Its caseload is manageable because it has a strict certiorari policy. India's caseload is far larger, necessitating permanent regional benches.

Canada

The Supreme Court of Canada sits in Ottawa, but its judges travel for educational events and occasionally hear cases outside. More relevant is the Court of Appeal for each province, which handles most appeals. India's High Courts are analogous, but the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction (via SLP) is far wider. Regional benches would align with Canada's recognition of regional diversity.

South Africa

The Constitutional Court of South Africa sits in Johannesburg, but the Supreme Court of Appeal sits in Bloemfontein. The country has a division of jurisdiction that prevents over-centralisation. India can draw lessons on how to allocate constitutional versus appellate functions.

IX. Draft Amendment and Implementation Roadmap

To provide certainty, a constitutional amendment may be optimal. Here is a draft clause for a new Article 130A:

Implementation would require:

• Year 1: Enact amendment, establish committee for infrastructure, increase judge strength to 40.
• Year 2: Identify sites, begin construction, appoint additional judges, notify rules.
• Year 3: Operationalise first regional bench (Chennai), followed by Mumbai and Kolkata.
• Year 5: Review and expand if necessary.

X. A Call to Action for the Republic's Fourth Decade

The Supreme Court of India stands at a crossroads. It can either remain a distant, Delhi-centric institution, increasingly inaccessible to the common citizen, or it can transform into a truly national court by establishing Regional Benches. The constitutional framework, the pressing need for access, the success of federal judiciaries abroad, and the possibilities offered by technology all point to one conclusion: Regional Benches are the need of the hour. It is not a proposal to weaken the Supreme Court, but to strengthen its legitimacy and outreach. The Chief Justice of India, with the approval of the President, must now exercise the power under Article 130 to appoint other places. If necessary, Parliament should step in to provide a statutory framework. The vision of the framers of justice available to all must be fulfilled. The time for action is now. As we complete 76 years as a Republic, let us make the Supreme Court truly supreme in accessibility, not just in authority.